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KEY EVENTS
On November 25th, 2020, RADAR Solutions Director and Adjunct Fellow at
Victoria University Shandon Harris-Hogan spoke on the topic of Countering
Violent Extremism: Perspectives from the Australian Context at the 2020 CASIS
West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question
and answer period with other speakers. The key points of discussion focused on
terrorism in Australia and Canada before and after ISIS spokesperson
Muhammad al-Adnani delivered a speech in September 2014, and its
implications for countering violent extremism (CVE).
NATURE OF DISCUSSION
Presentation
Mr. Harris-Hogan centered his presentation on comparing data from terrorist
attacks from before and after Muhammad al-Adnani’s speech in 2014, as well as
highlighting the predominance of teenagers amongst extremist actors. He then
argued that CVE program policies that focus on a secondary level intervention
framework might be more effective than those focused on targeted prevention
programs which have the potential to stigmatise communities.
Question Period
The question period focused on CVE and the role of the Internet and social media
in the radicalization process.
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BACKGROUND

Presentation
Terrorism threats in Australia before 2014 — mostly described as small but
persistent — were arguably predominantly from jihadists; data shows that 0
successful attacks were perpetrated, and 4 major attacks were foiled. However,
in September 2014, ISIS spokesperson, Muhammad al-Adnani, seemed to call
for refocusing the attention of Western-based supporters to attacking the foreign
enemies, which appeared to have been a critical point. Since September 2014,
Australia has experienced 7 successful Jihadist attacks, 16 major disruptionss and
an 800% increase in terrorism related arrests. Although Canada’s Jihadist
experience has been broadly comparable to Australia, the changes post-2014
have been less dramatic.
In Australia, prior to 2014, the average age of those arrested was older than 28
years old. As of September 2014, after al-Adnani speech, this number dropped
to 23 years old, and almost 40% of those arrested in the last five years were
teenagers, compared to none in the previous decade. Incidentally, al-Adnani
appears to have influenced the emergence of teenage extremist actors in
Australia. By analyzing the prison population, it is possible to understand the
challenge: the largest number of constraints in Australia among those who
support al-Qaeda or other affiliated groups are teenagers, and each one of them
were directly related to ISIS activities. So from a nonexistent threat, almost
overnight, teenagers have become a significant part of the counterterrorism
concern, which presents a whole different set of challenges for those working
underground. As a comparison, Canada has also experienced a drop in the age of
jihadist offenders since 2014 — from 27.6 to 24.9 years old — just not as sharply
as in Australia.
CVE has become a popular term used by governments, academics, and NGOs to
refer to non-coercive attempts to reduce involvement in terrorism, which
encompasses activities previously described as counter-radicalization. The term
radicalization first appeared about 20 years ago, and it remains both contested
and widely misunderstood making it difficult, therefore, to devise a solution.
Consequently, the ambiguity associated with radicalization has extended into the
policy response designed to address that problem, namely, countering violent
extremism. The lack of a clear definition or understanding resulted in policies
that tended to also be broad — e.g., moving from CVE to P/CVE which added a
prevention element before the countering, further expanding what was already a
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poorly defined concept and transforming it into an ever more vague amorphous
field.
Prior to 2014, only one of the 87 CVE programmes established in Australia
actually engaged individuals that could be considered to be on a radicalisation
trajectory. For that reason, the emphasis of Mr. Harris-Hogan’s work was on
programmes that aimed to prevent radicalization and build community resilience
amongst specific communities. Most of the prevention efforts in Australia have
been underpinned by the same broad assumption that increasing community
resilience or increasing social cohesion will decrease the number of radicalised
individuals. However, those CVE prevention programmes were unable to
demonstrate any significant links between their work at the preventative stage
and specific outcomes with regards to national security and violent extremism.
For the most part, the prevention efforts to find at-risk of radicalization
individuals using broad definitions and geographic focus have created at least
two problems: the wrong people could be targeted, and the risk of stigmatizing
and labelling certain communities as national security problems.
So what are the other options to manage at risk individuals in Australia? At risk
individuals in Mr. Harris-Hogan’s research are individuals that might be
returning from conflict sites; or those who had their passports cancelled and are
prevented from travelling; or individuals leaving prison and are connected
socially or through family networks to jihadists. Then, how can national security
agencies, frontline services, and communities support these individuals on a daily
basis? There is not a simple and definite answer to those questions. HarrisHogan’s research seems to indicate that each region needs to tailor interventions
to meet local conditions, and each intervention should focus on achieving
behavioural disengagement, instead of preventive measures based on reducing
levels of risk.
Question Period
Mr. Harris-Hogan’s research showed that there are improvements to be
implemented in CVE programs. However, a lot of government level delegations
and events come up with high level policy statements that rarely translate into
practice. There is always the danger of wanting to reinvent the wheel when there
already exist services or programs to deal with a problem. It is important to
realize it is cheaper to tap into the resources that already exist, and though we
have not figured out what to do, we have figured out what not to do. Therefore,
reshaping the framework or adjusting the focus might be financially more
beneficial.
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Over the last 20 years, research has shown that jihadist networks in social media
platforms are increasing; however, in almost every case, the Internet reinforces
already existing beliefs of like-minded individuals. In the extremism context,
there have been cases of individuals with severe mental health issues being barred
from online networks. Later, data showed that those outliers had an external
human influence that re-sparked and sustained the radicalization process. The
Internet certainly plays a role in the radicalization process, but the idea that social
media or the Internet have changed the way individuals radicalise is questionable.
The majority of cases involving deadly extremist attacks seem to indicate that the
radicalization process is an intensely social process, and few cases involve
individuals radicalized through social media.
KEY POINTS OF DISCUSSION
Presentation
•

•

•
•

•

Since September 2014, Australia has experienced 7 successful Jihadist
attacks, 16 major disruptions, and an 800% increase in terrorism related
arrests.
In Australia, prior to 2014, the average age of those arrested under terrorism
charges was older than 28 years old. After al-Adnani’s speech in September
2014, this number dropped to 23 years old.
The lack of a clear definition or understanding of radicalization results in
policies that tend to be broad.
Most prevention efforts in Australia have been underpinned by the broad
assumption that increasing community resilience or increasing social
cohesion will decrease the number of radicalised individuals.
Prevention efforts that use broad definitions and a geographic focus might
create two problems: the wrong people could be targeted, and the risk of
stigmatizing and labelling certain communities as national security problems.

Question Period
•
•

•

A lot of government level delegations and events come up with high level
policy statements that rarely translate into practice.
It is important to realize it is cheaper to tap into the resources that already
exist, and though we have not figured out what to do, we have figured out
what not to do.
The Internet reinforces already existing beliefs of like-minded individuals.
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The Internet certainly plays a role in the radicalization process, but the idea
that social media or the Internet have changed the way individuals radicalise
is questionable.
The majority of cases involving deadly extremist attacks seem to indicate that
the radicalization process is an intensely social process, and few cases involve
individuals radicalized through social media.
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